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Abstract
This paper examines Chelsea Manning’s self-narration of her leaking of government documents. The press has classified
her as a would-be whistleblower whose confusion over her sexuality and gender identity keep her from being an authentic
truth-teller. I dispute this reading and argue for seeing Manning as an exemplar of what I call “transformative truth-telling”: a
practice of truth-telling that challenges and seeks to transform dominant public/private distinctions that structure who counts
as a proper truth-teller. I argue that reading Manning’s act in this way reveals the democratic promise and riskiness of truthtellingand alerts democratic actors and theorists to the importance of cultivating broader and more generous democratic
receptivities to truth-telling.
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In May 2010, Chelsea Manning was arrested for allegedly leaking troves of American top-secret
information to Wikileaks. The key piece of evidence tying Manning to the leaks was a set of chat logs
between Manning and Adrian Lamo – a hacker famous for his infiltration of the New York Times
website (for which he was arrested and served time) – in which Manning appears to admit to the
leaking. Lamo had given the logs to the FBI. At the same time that Lamo gave the logs to the FBI, he
gave them to a journalist at Wired magazine. That journalist released those logs in abbreviated form,
holding back on what Wired viewed as “personal” parts of the logs that did not directly reference
Manning’s leaking. After intense public speculation about what they were hiding, Wired released the
full chat logs in July of 2011 and revealed that the missing parts of the logs primarily concerned
Manning’s questions about her gender identity, and her struggles with addressing those questions
under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. Wired had chosen to redact those parts of those logs because they saw
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them as merely “personal.” Yet in the full logs – which I take as my primary text here – Manning
explicitly and consistently links her leaking of government documents with her own struggles with
living under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell and, in particular, with her struggles with her gender identity. For
Manning, her struggles with state secrecy were connected with her struggles with the mandated
secrecy surrounding her sexual and gender identity.
In this paper, I examine the connections drawn by Manning between her public leaking and her
supposedly private struggles on behalf of challenging the dominance of the model of truth-telling
through which Manning’s actions are usually seen: the model of the “whistleblower.” The
whistleblower (a term coined in 1970’s America) is a figure from within an organization (governmental
or corporate), animated by a concern with the public good (not private interest), who reveals truths
about corruption or abuses of power on behalf of assuring accountability. This model has productively
legitimated forms of truth-telling that aim to expose arbitrariness on behalf of assuring accountability
and adherence to rules. However, this model also reifies a distinction between public and private that
tends to de-legitimate forms of truth-telling that do not fit within dominant norms of publicness.
Manning’s actions have been attacked on precisely these grounds. If, as one early profile of Manning
in the New York Times suggested, Manning leaked the documents out of “private” interests – out of
revenge for being bullied in the military or for her struggles under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, or out of
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“delusions of grandeur” – these “private” motives would undercut the meaning with which she
implicitly imbued the documents simply by releasing them: that is, that they reveal objective wrongs
that deserve public attention. When public intellectuals and figures step in to defend Manning –
notably, Glenn Greenwald and Daniel Ellsberg – they respond to these framings of her leaking by
simply ignoring Manning’s linkages between her personal struggles and her leaking of documents
and contending that Manning leaked documents not out of private interest, but on behalf of the public
good.
In contrast, I argue in this essay for acknowledging the connections between Manning’s “private”
struggles and public leaking, and for reading them not as corruptive of the attempt to speak truth, but
as exemplary of an alternative model of truth-telling that I call “transformative truth-telling.” Where the
whistleblower reveals facts hidden by the state or corporation on behalf of returning each organization
to its proper concern with the public good, the transformative truth-teller 1) speaks truth in ways that
contest and transform the existing public/private distinction (and the forms of injustice and oppression
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that this distinction may entrench); and 2) stakes the fate of their truth on public “vindication” and
response rather than on their own conformity to norms of publicness that structure who counts as a
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true truth-teller. In particular, I will argue for reading Manning’s leaking as an attempt not only to
reveal facts, but also to articulate herself, as a non-gender-conforming person, as a proper public
speaker of truth – an articulation that can be vindicated only through public response to the truths she
speaks. Read as an act of transformative truth-telling, Manning’s leaking appears less as a failed
attempt to assure governmental accountability and more as a risky (and still active) solicitation to a
not yet existent public that would respond to Manning’s truth-telling by transforming the world in such
a way that she could appear as a proper truth-teller in it.
My examination of Manning in this essay shifts our theoretical focus from an analysis of truth to an
analysis of the act of truth-telling. Analyses focused on truth tend to pose questions of validity that
abstract from (or simply ignore) the actions and persons that vault that truth into the public sphere.
For example, Joshua Cohen has recently argued for a “political conception of truth” that can “serve as
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common ground” in politics. Cohen argues that this political conception of truth “needs to avoid
asserting any theory about the nature of truth or its lack of a nature” and to offer a basic set of criteria
by which we can assess whether truth claims should be viewed as properly public, as part of the
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exercise of public reason. Cohen’s approach aims to overcome the problem of truth-telling I
mentioned above (that some people, due to particular traits or identities, are taken to not be proper
truth-tellers) by offering general criteria by which we might judge an individual’s statements about
truth to be properly admissible into public debate. Yet in so doing, Cohen downplays the politicality of
truth-telling – that it happens in a public, political context where gendered/raced/classed norms of
public comportment inflect and influence public response to, and assessment of, the truth-teller’s
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speech.
In contrast, an analysis focused on acts of truth-telling – and, in particular here, what I am calling
transformative truth-telling – attends precisely to the political stakes of how we understand the role
and practice of the truth-teller. My focus on truth-telling builds on Michel Foucault’s late work
on parrhesia. In his late lectures at the College de France and UC Berkeley, Foucault argues for a
turn away from “the problem of truth” and toward the “problem of the truth-teller, or of truth-telling as
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an activity” – that is, as he puts it in The Courage of Truth, toward the project of “analyz[ing] the
conditions and forms of the type of act by which the subject manifests himself when speaking the
10
truth, by which I mean, thinks of himself and is recognized by others as speaking the truth.” Writers
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(like Cohen) focused on “the problem of truth” – or what Foucault calls “the analytics of truth” –
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attempt to articulate “the criteria for true statements and sound reasoning,” while writers interested
in the “question of truth from the point of view of truth-telling as an activity” ask questions like: “Who is
able to tell the truth? What are the moral, the ethical, and the spiritual conditions which entitle
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someone to present himself as, and to be considered as, a truthteller?” This “critical” approach to
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truth-telling reveals that no form of veridiction is absolute and that forms of truth-telling are
historically and politically conditioned in different ways in different times and places. From this
perspective, the analytics of truth, which presents itself as objectively identifying criteria for assessing
or speaking truth, appears as itself always partial, since it operates within a historically and politically
constrained understanding of the nature of truth and truth-telling.
Focusing on the activity of truth-telling – and who counts as a proper truth-teller – thus allows us to
see the partiality of the whistleblower model, as well as the closures this model effects on our political
vision of truth and truthtelling. Further, however, placing the activity of truth-telling (rather than the
problem of truth) in the center of our analysis allows us see the political productiveness of practices of
truth-telling that contravene or challenge this dominant model: that is, that truth-telling may not
just reinstate or reproduce the status quo (as Cohen assumes, and as Hannah Arendt sometimes
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suggests ), but may also transform it. Specifically, I will argue for reading Manning’s truth-telling
not only as shoring up existing power structures, but also as an attempt to construct a new social
world where she would be viewed as a proper truth-teller. It is in this sense that transformative truthtelling differs from whistleblowing. The whistleblower seeks to restore the social world by putting an
end to deception, while the transformative truth-teller, through challenging our conception of proper
truth-telling, seeks – at least in part – to imagine and build a new world.

In the following, I first briefly discuss the story of Manning’s life, her leaks to Wikileaks, and her
subsequent arrest. I then discuss the shortcomings of the whistleblower model to adequately describe
Manning’s truth-telling. In the third section, I argue for reading Manning’s truth-telling not simply as an
attempt to reveal facts that were hidden, but as a response to (sometimes violent) techniques of
secrecy that constructed her as improperly public and not worthy of being heard. In the fourth section,
I argue for reading Manning’s truth-telling as transformative – that is, as aimed not primarily at
governmental accountability, but at soliciting a not yet existent public that would respond to Manning
as a proper public truth-teller and freely use the information she leaked to collaboratively chart a new
course for addressing governmental corruption and abuses of power. Finally, in the conclusion, I
argue for cultivating broader and more generous democratic modes of receptivity to truth-telling.

1. The Story16
Chelsea Manning grew up in a small suburb of Oklahoma City. Raised as a boy, “Bradley,” Chelsea
often felt like an outsider in a world of boys focused on athletics and the pursuit of girls, and spent
most of her adolescence on computers and playing video games. She came out to friends as gay
when she was thirteen. As an adult, Manning would often share her story, which she had crafted into
a hard luck coming out narrative with people upon first meeting them. In the chat logs with Lamo, for
instance, Manning launched into her childhood story soon into their encounter:
i was born in central Oklahoma, grew up in a small town called crescent, just north of oklahoma city … i
was a short (still am), very intelligent (could read at 3 and multiply/divide by 4), very effeminate, and
glued to a computer screen at these young ages [MSDOS/Windows 3.1 timeframe] … i played SimCity
[the original] obsessively … an easy target by kindergarten … grew up in a highly evangelical town with
more church pews than people … so, i got pretty messed up at school … ‘girly boy’ ‘teacher’s pet’, etc”
(MLCL, 5–6).

Manning’s home life was also difficult. Her mother, who was Welsh (Manning’s father had met her
when posted abroad with the Army), was lonely and depressed, while Manning’s father drank and
was verbally abusive. In Manning’s words, “home was the same, alcoholic father and mother…mother
was very nice, but very needy emotionally… father was very wealthy (lots of nice toys/computer stuff),
but abusive” (MLCL, 6). Manning’s father ultimately left her mother for another woman, and
Manning’s mother moved back to Wales when she was about to start high school. Manning went with
her, but ended up moving back to Oklahoma (with her father’s help) after finishing high school in
2005. Manning moved out of her father’s house not long after this (in 2006) after conflicts with her
father’s new wife, bounced around for a while working low paying jobs before landing in a suburb of
Washington, DC, where she stayed with her aunt. Chelsea’s aunt offered her a stable home and
Manning attended junior college briefly, but ultimately felt stalled in her progress and decided (with
her father’s advice) to join the Army.
At the same time that she was deciding to join the Army, Manning was creating a gay male circle of
friends for herself in the DC area and was also embarking on her first real relationship. In addition,
she was making more and more connections in a hacker culture that she admired, but was not totally
a part of. Her best friend – Danny Clark – was a big part of this culture, living as he did in the pika
house at MIT (a longstanding home of hackers and hacker culture) and working for Richard
Stallman’s Free Software Foundation. Through Danny, Manning absorbed some of this culture and
extended her interest in and knowledge of Stallman’s ideas (to which I will return later in the paper).
Manning’s move into the Army stood in obvious tension with these other strains of her life, which
affirmed queer equality (the Army at the time was still governed by “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”) and an antiauthority, antiownership outlook within the Free Software movement and pika house.
Manning’s tenure within the Army reflected this tension and was tempestuous. She was assigned
early on to become an intelligence analyst, which took advantage of her computer skills and
intelligence. She liked her job, as she told Lamo during their chat sessions, but she continually found
herself in clashes with authority figures. She had angry outbursts several times before she was even
deployed to Iraq (leading her supervisor to recommend against deploying her – the supervisor was

ignored) and while stationed abroad. While in Iraq, she ultimately punched her supervisor in the face
(for which Manning was severely disciplined and reduced in rank). In addition to Manning’s
confrontations with authority figures, she was very lonely. Short of coming out to her fellow soldiers,
Manning was not particularly closeted about her sexuality – for instance, she kept a fairy wand on her
desk and posted fearlessly on her Facebook page about her sexuality and opposition to Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell – and was penalized for it by being generally ignored or disliked by her fellow soldiers.
17

As we now know, in early 2010, Manning began leaking vast quantities of data to Wikileaks (after
first contacting the Washington Post and New York Times) when she was in the United States on
leave. She first leaked what are now known as the “Afghan War Logs” and the “Iraq War Logs.” She
went on to send the video footage now known as “Collateral Murder” (of U.S. servicemen shooting
civilians from helicopters) and the huge trove of diplomatic cables now known as “Cablegate.” After
sending all of this information, but before most of it was released, Manning initiated a chat online in
May 2010 with Adrian Lamo. The impetus for the chat was Manning’s increasing emotional
desperation following her physical assault on her commanding officer and her subsequent demotion
in rank. In those chats, Lamo assured Manning that “I’m a journalist and a minister. You can pick
either, and treat this as a confession or an interview (never to be published) & enjoy a modicum of
legal protection” (MLCL, 3). Manning shared everything with Lamo, who almost immediately turned
her in to the FBI. Soon thereafter, Manning was arrested and jailed, where she remained for over
1000 days before her trial began. For a period of time, Manning was confined to conditions that could
arguably be classified as torture: among them, being forced to sleep naked and kept in solitary
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confinement for extended periods of time. Manning was ultimately found guilty of violating the 1917
Espionage Act and sentenced to 35 years in prison – a sentence that, as New York Times reporter
Charlie Savage notes, is “the longest ever handed down in a case involving a leak of United States
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government information for the purpose of having the information reported to the public.” After her
conviction, Manning officially took the name “Chelsea” and (at the time of completing final revisions of
20
this paper) described herself as trans*.

2. Manning as Whistleblower?
In an essay in The New Republic, Harvard law professor Yochai Benkler portrays Chelsea Manning
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as part of the “long-respected tradition” of whistleblowers in the United States. Whistleblowers, on
Benkler’s account, serve the vital constitutional role of assuring “oversight” of institutions otherwise
shrouded in secrecy – for example (and especially), institutions within the arena of national security.
Whistleblowers “offer a pressure valve, constrained by the personal risk whistleblowers take, and
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fueled by whatever moral courage they can muster.” Benkler argues that Manning should be
classed within this tradition – of which Ellsberg is on his account the most notable example – not
because of the effects of her actions, but because of the moral “motives” revealed in her statement on
her guilty plea.
Benkler’s emphasis on Manning’s moral motives on behalf of “oversight” of government (or private
corporations) resonates with broader American scripts about the figure of the “whistleblower,” a term
which was coined in the 1970’s by Ralph Nader (Nader hoped to avoid the negative connotations of
words like “snitch”; the term whistleblower refers to a referee who blows the whistle on a foul in the
course of a game). Nader similarly locates the importance of the whistleblower in assuring oversight
of governmental and corporate organizations (Nader compares the structure of organizations to
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feudalism) which otherwise might go unchecked. Whistleblowing, Nader says, is the “last line of
defense ordinary citizens have against the denial of their rights and the destruction of their interests
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by secretive and powerful institutions.” Nader also, like Benkler, emphasizes the importance of
individual moral “courage” and care for the public good as the proper motivations of the
whistleblower. Whistleblowing, Nader says, depends upon individuals’ “professional and individual
responsibility,” which consists in “placing responsibility to society over that to an illegal or negligent or
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unjust organizational policy or activity.” For Nader – as for Benkler – in other words, the
whistleblower serves an important role in society as a safeguard for the public good when it is
threatened by private interest pursued under shadow of secrecy.

We can see this whistleblower script echoing throughout the many articles and opinion pieces
written not only by Benkler, but by Manning’s other defenders. For example, Glenn Greenwald – a
prolific defender of Manning writing for Salon.com and The Guardian – continually refers to Manning
as a “whistleblower” and stresses Manning’s morally pure motives. For Greenwald, the LamoManning chat logs show that “the private decided to leak these documents after [s]he became
disillusioned with the Iraq war. [S]he described how reading classified documents made [her], for the
first time, aware of the breadth of the corruption and violence committed by [her] country and
allies…When asked by the informant why [s]he did not sell the documents to a foreign government for
profit, Manning replied that [s]he wanted the information to be publicly known in order to trigger
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‘worldwide discussion, debates, and reforms’.” While Manning’s biographer, Denver Nicks, claims
that Manning may not be a traditional whistleblower simply due to the vast scope of documents she
released – unlike the traditional whistleblower, who releases documents targeted at revealing a
specific injustice – he nonetheless stresses that “[Chelsea] Manning’s decision to leak state secrets
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was clearly made with altruistic motivations.”
By portraying Manning as a whistleblower, Manning’s defenders reveal an important part of her
story. As Benkler, Greenwald, and Madar argue, the chat logs between Manning and Lamo and
Manning’s guilty plea statement show that Manning was motivated by a concern with the public good.
Manning tells Lamo, for example, that she would not have sold her data “because its public data”
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(MLCL, 37); “it belongs in the public domain….it should be a public good” (Ibid.). Yet Manning’s
chats with Lamo also reveal a narrative of her acts that connects her struggle with state secrecy to
her struggle with living under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, and with her gender identity. In her introduction of
herself to Lamo, Manning identifies herself in terms of these two aspects of her life: “hi…how are
you?...im an army intelligence analyst, deployed to eastern Baghdad, pending discharge for
‘adjustment disorder’ in lieu of ‘gender identity disorder’ … im sure you’re pretty busy … if you had
unprecedented access to classified networks 14 hours a day 7 days a week for 8+ months, what
would you do?” (MLCL, 2) For Manning, the thread that ties these two aspects of her life together is
clear: mandated secrecy. As she says after referring Lamo to the wikileaks website (without directly
identifying herself yet as the leaker), “living such an opaque life, has forced me never to take
transparency, openness, and honesty for granted” (MLCL, 4). Manning’s negative experiences of
having to hide parts of herself under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell are not distinct from her motives for leaking
information; rather, they are part of why she feels the need to ensure transparency of military
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actions.
When Manning’s supporters efface these connections between her personal struggles and her
leaking of documents, they do so in order to justify her actions as in service of the public good (rather
than private interest or revenge). Yet in so doing, they also unintentionally repeat rather than remedy
the injury done to Manning by the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy – namely, by constructing her struggles
with gender identity as “secrets” that must be kept if she is to serve the public good. This seems to do
a specific injustice to Manning. It also, however, blocks from view a story implicit in Manning’s selfrepresentation: namely, a story about how supposedly “private” aspects of Manning’s motivations to
leak documents may themselves have been formed by Manning’s public experiences of failing to fit
into public norms of gender comportment in the Army.
In the next section, I read Manning’s narrative of her motivations to leak documents not as an
expression of prepolitical “private” feelings, but rather as a narrative that reveals how publicness and
privateness are constructed through norms of public comportment that frame Manning’s non-genderconformity and non-conformity to the Army’s construction of the proper soldier as necessarily
“private.” Specifically, I will argue that Manning’s experience of state mandated secrecy is not simply
of a prohibition – of being forced to hide information (about herself and the state) – but of a set of
techniques of secrecy (commands, shaming, harassment, ridicule) that publicly construct her as an
improper public speaker. In this argument, I build on Michael Warner’s dual insight: first, that the
supposedly private sphere is always publicly constructed – as we can see in the gay and lesbian
experience of the “closet” as private (even though it is publicly constructed by heteronormative
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discourse) ; and second, that supposedly public, neutral, universal forms of comportment are
always defined by partial (masculine, white, educated, justificatory) forms of comportment that we
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tend to define as private. Focusing on the public construction of norms of public and private, I will
suggest that the public/private distinction upon which the whistleblower model relies is itself the
product of techniques of secrecy, enforced through practices of domination and subordination.

3. Secrecy
In the narrative of her leaking that she offers to Lamo, Manning identifies two key turning points which
sparked her desire to tell the truth about herself and governmental actions abroad: first, the moment
that she identifies as leading her to question American actions in Iraq (and her part in it) and, second,
the moments when she begins to question her gender identity. In both turning points, Manning
confronts her “failure” to fit into norms of publicness in the Army. Following Judith Halberstam, I do
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not assume that such experiences of failure simply reveal a lack of success. Rather, I see Manning’s
experience of failure as also revealing problems with the disciplinary norms inherent in dominant
notions of “success” – here, with dominant notions of who counts as a proper truth-teller. I first
discuss Manning’s failure to fit into the norm of what I call the “docile soldier” and then turn to her
failure to fit into norms of gender and sexuality.
In her chats with Lamo, Manning identifies the moment that she says she began to have doubts
about American actions in Iraq (and the secrecy surrounding them). This moment occurred following
an incident where the American military supported Iraqi forces in detaining and perhaps torturing
individuals who had distributed “anti- Iraqi literature.” This happened during the first weeks of
Manning’s deployment to Iraq (in October or November of 2009). Manning says:
i think the thing that got me the most…that made me rethink the world more than anything…was
watching 15 detainees taken by the Iraqi Federal Police … for printing ‘anti-Iraqi literature’… the iraqi
federal police wouldn’t cooperate with US forces, so i was instructed to investigate the matter, find out
who the ‘bad guys’ were, and how significant this was for the FPs [Federal Police] … it turned out, they
had printed a scholarly critique against PM Maliki … i had an interpreter read it for me … and when i
found out that it was a benign political critique titled ‘Where did the money go?” and following the
corruption trail within the PM’s cabinet … i immediately took that information and *ran* to the officer to
explain what was going on … he didn’t want to hear any of it … he told me to shut up and explain how we
could assist the FPs in finding *MORE* detainees …
(my emphasis, MLCL, 23–24)

The most obvious thing that jumps out at the reader from this story is American hypocrisy: Manning
realizes that the United States says that it is promoting democracy and free speech, when in reality it
is helping the Iraqis restrict free speech and democracy on behalf of stability. However, there is
another important part of this story – namely, that Manning is told that the form of speech she
exercises here (essentially, whistleblowing) is not properly public. She is told to “shut up” and instead
to “explain” to her commander how she can help further restrict free speech and democracy. It would
be a mistake, though, to read this moment as a simple silencing of Manning. Rather, her commanding
officer also commands her to speak differently – to speak in the register of American interests rather
than in terms of right and wrong, true and false. The officer’s command is not prohibitive, in other
words, but productive: it disciplines (or attempts to discipline) Manning into a particular form of
subjectivity – to construct her as a proper soldier, whose speech can be properly heard only when it
follows commands and identifies with the national interest.
Manning tells Lamo that, after this moment, “everything started slipping” and that she “saw things
differently” (MLCL, 24). In what way did she “see things differently”? Despite her officer’s command to
speak differently – to simply obey orders – that command did not turn Manning into a fully docile
soldier. Instead, it produced a soldier who saw her public persona – and the public persona all
soldiers were disciplined into adopting – as complicit in governmental wrongs, as itself a corrupt
figure. As Manning tells Lamo, “i had always questioned the [way] things worked, and investigated to
find the truth…but that was a point where I was a *part* of something … i was actively involved in
something that i was completely against …”; “i was part of it … and completely helpless …” (MLCL,
24). Manning was “helpless” to address her own corruption because the only way she could be heard
was via the public persona of the docile soldier – a persona which could not question orders or her

superiors’ view of the national interest. The proper public speech that Manning had been disciplined
into adopting had no language with which she could question or change American behavior.
At the same time that Manning was struggling with the command to become the docile soldier that
she felt to be corrupt, she was realizing her failure to fit into another norm of proper public
comportment in the Army: conformity to a traditionally masculine gender and hetero-sexuality.
Chatting with Lamo in May 2010, she says, “8 months ago [at the beginning of his deployment], if
you’d have asked me whether i wanted i would identify as female, i’d say you were crazy … that
started to slip very quickly, as the stresses continued and piled up …” (MLCL, 39). Those stresses
included continual mocking and at least low-level harassment. As Manning says in an earlier set of
chat logs with Zinnia Jones (a transgender activist and blogger): “being around my platoon for 24
hours a day … it took them awhile, but they started figuring me out, making fun of me, mocking me,
harassing me, heating up with one or two physical attacks … which I fended off just fine, but it was
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scary.”
Just like her commander’s demand that Manning speak differently – as a docile soldier – this
ongoing harassment, ridicule, and ostracism by her fellow soldiers was not just prohibitive (leading
Manning to “hide” her sexuality and non-gender-conformity), but productive. It was not productive,
however, in leading Manning to behave in a more “heterosexual” and/or “masculine” manner. Instead,
this harassment worked, first, to simply make Manning see herself as her ridiculers did – as
improperly gendered, queer, out of place. Manning says to Lamo that her gender identity is “clearly
an issue … i mean, i don’t think its normal for people to spend this much time worrying about whether
they’re behaving masculine enough, whether what they’re going to say is going to be perceived as
‘gay’… not to mention how i feel about the situation … for whatever reason, im not comfortable with
myself … i mean, i behave and look like a male, but its not ‘me’ :L” (my emphasis, Ibid.). Second, this
harassment made Manning feel, in her words, like a “ghost” (MLCL, 3, 28, 42) – visible (as improperly
gendered) and invisible (as who she feels she is) at the same time. As Manning says, “its just such a
disconnect between myself, and what i know … and what people see” (MLCL, 12). What is it that
people do not see about Manning? Manning does not mean that people do not see her nonconformity to norms of gender and sexuality. Indeed, that is precisely the problem – they see it all too
well, ridicule and shame it. Rather, she seems to mean that they misunderstand this non-conformity –
that they see it as revealing her unimportance, her triviality. As Manning puts it, “im way way way too
easy to marginalize … i don’t like this person that people see … no-one knows who i am inside”
(MLCL, 26). Just like the norm of the docile soldier led her to feel powerless – unable to speak truly
and be heard – so too with the norms of masculinity and heterosexuality (enforced through
harassment and ridicule) that construct Manning as someone who, because she appears queer and
improperly gendered, has nothing important to say and cannot be heard as a meaningful, proper
public speaker. As Manning says, “ive been so isolated for so long … i just wanted to be nice, and
live a normal life … but events kept forcing me to figure out ways to survive … smart enough to know
whats going on, but helpless to do anything … no-one took any notice of me” (my emphasis, MLCL,
10).
Manning’s narrative of how she came to feel unheard and powerless illustrates Warner’s claim that
some attributes are coded as unfit to appear in public (especially non-conforming sexuality and
gender identity) not before public discourse, but through it: for example (and as in Manning’s case),
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through ridicule, ostracism, harassment, and denial of some of the right to speak. To put the point
differently, the disconnect felt by Manning – between who she is and who others see – is not
produced by the actual invisibility of her sexuality and gender, but rather by others’ construction of
that sexuality and gender performance as illicit, deviant, and best kept to herself. This is the “open
secret” of sexuality described by Eve Sedgwick – where queer persons’ sense of invisibility is actually
the product of their visibility, and their vulnerability to the constructions of their identity by
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others. The logic of the “open secret” in Manning’s case – where her sexual and gender identity is
coded as purely “private,” but which at the same time is constructed and ascribed by others and in
their terms rather than practiced or revealed on the terms of the queer individual – renders Manning
always improperly public insofar as she is always articulated by others as bringing the properly
private into the public.

If we were evaluating Manning’s acts according to the traditional whistleblower model, her
struggles with the secrecy mandated by Don’t Ask Don’t Tell would appear irrelevant at best and, at
worst, as problematic for Manning’s attempt to tell the truth about governmental bad acts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In this model, if Manning’s personal struggles influenced, or were linked with, her
whistleblowing in any way, then the act of truthtelling appears no longer as an act that simply renders
facts visible that were being kept hidden – on behalf of the public good – but as a possibly biased
attempt to (mis)use facts on behalf of private interest.
Yet Manning’s narrative of her experience reveals, as I have suggested, that this public/private
division does not denote a pre-political distinction between two spheres, but is actually constructed
through public discourse, norms, and experiences. In Manning’s narrative, techniques of secrecy
(sometimes violent) produce our understanding of the proper distinction between public and private,
between what can appear in public and what should be hidden. The public/private distinction upon
which the whistleblower model relies thus does not appear as a set of criteria that can validate the
truth spoken by the truth-teller, but instead as a disciplinary norm that marginalizes and casts as
“inauthentic” would-be truth-tellers who seek to contest techniques of secrecy that classify them as
improperly public – marginal, unimportant, not worthy of being heard.
Rather, then, than attempting to fit Manning into the mold of the classic whistleblower (a mold
which hides and is complicit in the disciplinary techniques which cast him as improperly public), what
if we read Manning’s truthtelling precisely as a response to the techniques of secrecy – the public
shaming, ostracism, ridicule, and discipline – that constructed her as an improper soldier and public
person, unworthy of notice? Read in this way, we can identify an alternative, and more compelling,
interpretation of her claim that she leaked documents on behalf of the public good: not as a failed
attempt to serve a public good that excludes her as a proper public speaker, but rather as an
enactment of herself, as a non-gender conforming person and as a person resistant to the Army’s
articulation of the national interest, as a proper speaker and defender of that public good. Indeed, in a
telling (and light-hearted) moment of her chat with Adrian Lamo, Manning herself links together her
non-conformity to Army norms of pursuing American interests to her gender non-conformity: Manning
tells Lamo that she “listened and lip synced to Lady Gaga’s Telephone while exfiltrating possibly the
largest data spillage in American history” (MLCL, 37). Here, not only does Manning say that she lip
synced to the music of a female singer while leaking data – thus performatively, if also pseudoprivately, enacting gender non-conformity; she also says that she lip synced to the music of a singer
who herself constantly plays with gender and gender norms. Manning’s leaking, as portrayed in the
scene she describes here, does not consist in her moral appeal to the public good on behalf of
governmental accountability, but rather in a creative performance of non-conformity to dominant
models of publicness.
Read in this way, Manning’s practice of truth-telling reveals an alternative way of conceiving the
import of truthtelling more generally: not simply as a practice of revealing facts, but also as a political
practice that challenges and seeks to transform the disciplinary techniques of secrecy that classify
some individuals as improperly public, not worthy of being heard. I suggest that we call this model of
truth-telling “transformative truth-telling” – a practice of truth-telling that does not simply state facts,
but that also seeks to transform, in part through its own enactment, the norms of publicness that
structure who counts as a proper truth-teller.
In the next section, I further develop the model of transformative truth-telling by examining how
Manning understands the goal of her truth-telling. Specifically, I will show – through putting together
Manning’s narratives of her personal transition (from male to female) and her desire for public
transformation in response to her leaks – that Manning was not primarily interested in assuring official
accountability, but in public engagement with, and use of, the information she leaked. Manning hoped
the public would use the information she leaked to freely collaborate, discuss, and debate how to best
address the abuses of power and techniques of secrecy Manning revealed. While Manning knew this
public response was uncertain, I argue for nonetheless seeing her solicitation of such a public as
meaningful and important. Addressing two authors (Cornelia Vismann and Michel Foucault) whose
work suggests that modern truth-telling inevitably shores up existing power structures and norms, I

argue, drawing on the work of Jacques Rancière, that to read Manning’s act as only reflecting existing
power structures prevents us from attending to how she narrates and performs her act also as a
solicitation: a risky attempt to construct a new social world, not just repeat our old one.

4. Transformative Truth-Telling
In her chats with Lamo, Manning consistently connects her goal of personal transition to her goal in
leaking national security documents. For example, she says, “i don’t know what im going to do now …
well, wait … obviously … i guess i could start electrolysis as soon as im back in the states … even
before im outprocessed … still gonna be weird watching the world change on the macro scale, while
my life changes on the micro” (my emphasis, MLCL, 19). Similarly, Manning says at another point in
the chat: “im just kind of drifting now … waiting to redeploy to the US, be discharged … and figure out
how on earth im going to transition … all while witnessing the world freak out as its most intimate
secrets are revealed … its such an awkward place to be in, emotionally and psychologically” (my
emphasis, MLCL, 9-10). What, if anything, ties the two forms of “transition” together? I will suggest
below that, for Manning, her truth-telling in both cases resists expert control over information on
behalf of a more creative, communal, and collaborative use of information.
In her discussion of her hope to transition (from male to female), Manning sometimes portrays her
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goal as primarily physical – changing her physical appearance to match her inner identity. Yet
Manning more often portrays her goal of transition as a more open-ended practice of truthfulness with
no guaranteed end-point: that is, of experimenting with, discussing, and using information about
herself differently. In particular, Manning values the prospect of being able to freely experiment with
her self, with who she is, without being monitored by the Army: “i just wanted enough time to figure
myself out…to be myself…and not be running around all the time, trying to meet someone else’s
expectations” (MLCL, 9). Manning pursued one such experiment when she came home on leave from
Iraq: “i mean, 99.9% of people coming from iraq and afghanistan want to come home, see their
families, get drunk, get laid … i wanted to try living as a woman, for whatever reason” (MLCL, 40).
Manning dressed as a woman – “crossdress[ing], full on … wig, breastforms, dress, the works … i
had crossdressed before … but i was public … for a few days” – and “took the Acela from DC to
Boston … whatever compelled me to do that … idk … but i wanted to see my then-still-boyfriend … i
rode the train, dressed in a business casual outfit” (MLCL, 39). Manning says that she “blended in”
(MLCL, 39), didn’t “think … all the time about how im perceived” (MLCL, 40), and “really enjoyed the
trip,” with the exception of an encounter with a transphobic conductor, who loudly said “Thank you,
MISTER Manning …” when he clipped Manning’s ticket (MLCL, 39). This experiment clearly does not
resolve Manning’s questions about her gender identity – she still felt that she needed to figure things
out – but she felt pleasure in her ability, beyond the reach of the military (even if only momentarily and
uncertainly), to experiment in her public self-presentation.
In addition to experimentation with living as a woman, Manning pursued her goal of transition
through talking about her situation with friends and those she considered equals (for example,
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Lamo). In this sense, Manning’s approach to her transition is collaborative rather than deferential.
Indeed, Manning consistently portrays her desire to “figure herself out” as standing at odds with
experts’ attempts to help her do so. She says, for example, that she is “an awkward patient” for her
therapist: “i had an hour session with my therapist … i didnt say word for like 30 minutes … i just sat
there, and he took notes … im an awkward patient … its difficult to communicate with therapists … i
try to explain something, and they twist it around … and then they ask why i dont want to say
anything” (MLCL, 30). In a similar vein, she expresses a skeptical view of the DSM as a way of
categorizing and controlling people: “i don’t believe a third of the DSM-IV-TR” (MLCL, 30); “so many
Disorders that so many people fall into … it just seems like a method to categorize a person,
medicate them, and make money from prescription medications” (MLCL, 31). Manning sees her
therapist and the DSM as blockages rather than aids to identifying the truth of herself because, like
the officer who commanded her to speak differently in the Army, they seem to inscribe her into
categories and narratives with which she does not identify – categories and narratives that render
her, as in his therapist’s office, powerless to speak (“then they ask why i dont want to say anything”).

This is not to say that Manning’s discussions with friends about her transition – as in the
“confession” she offers to Lamo and the coming out story that she tells to people when she meets
them – and her experiment of cross-dressing are not constituted by the expert-driven genre of truthtelling that Michel Foucault discusses in The History of Sexuality, Volume One as “the
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confession.” There, Foucault argues that the modern demand that individuals transform their desires
into discourse actually constitutes the subjectivity that they believed they were merely confessing. In
particular, the modern subject formed by the practice of confession sees her sexual desires, rather
than her sexual behavior, as expressing the truth of herself and she believes that she can only
discover that truth through endlessly speaking those desires and submitting them to the expertise,
and expert categories, of others (the doctor, the psychiatrist, the teacher, etc.). Read through this
Foucauldian lens, Manning’s resistance to expert definitions does not mean that she is free of power,
or of management by expertise. Indeed, her attempt to fully articulate and speak the truth of herself
through the activity of confession suggests that her truth-telling is constructed by a disciplinary
technique (confession to experts) that she sees herself as resisting.
However, to see Manning’s resistance to experts solely through this Foucauldian lens keeps us
from attending to the inaugural and productive power of Manning’s own narration and interpretation of
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her experiences. As Jacques Rancière argues in his important depiction of workers’ dreams and
th
writings in 19 century France, Proletarian Nights, approaches to politics that view people’s words as
“symptoms of social reality” (Rancière is worried about Althusserian Marxism) blind us to how those
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words may also be “writing and thinking at work on the construction of a different social world.” That
is, even if workers’ dreams and writings do not completely escape the world in which they are
dominated, these dreams and writings have power nonetheless in creating the living possibility of
another, freer social existence, and of the political action that might bring it into being. Indeed, even if
Foucault’s analysis productively shows us the techniques of power that are reflected in Manning’s act
– that is, how her truthtelling may shore up rather than challenge an expert-governed understanding
of truth-telling, identity, and sex – we should also ask what reality Manning seeks to construct in her
speech and deeds. What social world does she hope her actions will bring into being? What
possibilities might her deeds open up that are not captured by the categories and constraints of the
existing social and political reality?
As we have seen, Manning’s depiction of her personal transition opens up the possibility of, and
holds out hope for, a world where she could creatively experiment with the truth of her self, in
collaboration with others who are her equals, without being defined and managed by experts.
Manning similarly depicts her leaking of government documents as an attempt to subvert expert
control over information – a control that renders not just Manning, but the public, powerless to speak
about and use it. She says:
hypothetical question: if you had free reign over classified networks for long periods of time…say, 8-9
months…and you saw incredible things, awful things … things that belonged in the public domain, and
not on some server stored in a dark room in Washington DC … what would you do? ... things that would
have an impact on 6.7 billion people … say … a database of half a million events during the iraq war …
from 2004 to 2009 … with reports, date time groups, lat-lon locations, casualty figures … ? or 260,000
state department cables from embassies and consulates all over the world, explaining how the first world
exploits the third, in detail, from an internal perspective?”
(my emphasis, MLCL, 8)

Manning’s depiction of state secrecy is not focused here on a particular wrong that has been
covered up, but instead on the forms of oppression and control constructed by techniques of secrecy.
The state’s control over information renders the public subservient to state officials – who claim to
possess important information that the public does not – and leaves the public less able to freely form
41
its own opinions and to chart a meaningful political course.
Yet could Manning’s truth-telling really challenge the state’s control of information and truth? As
Cornelia Vismann argues in Files: Law and Media Technology, society’s demand for disclosure of
files in modern regimes (constituted through filing) does not challenge the state’s authority to record
and be arbiter of truth, but rather shores up a regime of validity structured by state filing practices –
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that is, that those practices indicate and constitute truth. As Vismann puts it, “[t]he state compiles
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records, society demands their disclosure.” Through the lens of Vismann’s work, Manning’s act
appears to challenge the state’s claim to secrecy while at the same time reinforcing the validity of
techniques of filing that enshrine the state as the proper arbiter of truth. In this sense, even if Manning
performs truth-telling transformatively – creating space for non-gender-conforming individuals to
speak truth and act politically – her enactment of truth-telling as a practice of leaking documents
recorded and filed by the state seems to render her truth-telling ultimately deferent to the state’s
authority, or the authority of its file-keepers, to say what is and is not true.
Vismann’s work rightly presses us not to overestimate the emancipatory potential of truth-telling,
but like Foucault’s analysis of “the confession,” it may overdetermine how we view Manning’s truthtelling and lead us to ignore or be inattentive to the meaning that Manning ascribes to her own
actions, and to the possible (unexpected or contingent) effects of those actions. To follow Vismann, in
other words, might lead us to approach Manning’s truth-telling undemocratically – viewing its meaning
and effects as only pre-determined and constrained by material techniques rather than also opening
possibilities for revision and transformation through political action. How might we understand
Manning’s truth-telling if we attended to the contingent possibilities that she sees as opened up by her
act – possibilities that may not have come to fruition, but which may have meaning anyway as a
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solicitation to a future public?
In the chat logs, Manning tells Lamo that she hopes for a public response to her leaking.
Specifically, she claims that the point of her leaking is to encourage public discussion and ownership
of information that may shift some political agency from the state to the public. For example, Manning
tells Lamo that “god knows what happens now” once cables are released (MLCL, 32) – “hopefully
worldwide discussion, debates, and reforms” (my emphasis, MLCL, 32). Manning’s emphasis here is
on the public – albeit an uncertain public – taking up and using the information she released to
transform their social world.
Manning’s focus on the public is also present when she tells Lamo that the data she leaked to
Wikileaks “belongs in the public domain” not only because it is a “public good,” but also because
“information should be free” (my emphasis, MLCL, 37) – a phrase derived from the hacker culture in
which Manning found a partial home. As Denver Nicks notes, “[i]n quipping ‘Information should be
free,’ [Chelsea] was aligning [her]self with the hackers’ free software ideal.” The free software ideal is
an ideal of collaborative, creative, public freedom in the use of information: an ideal that posits, in
Nicks’ paraphrase, that “[w]hether it be the source code to a computer program, scientific data, or
basic facts about the conduct of a country’s foreign policy, information ought to be widely available
and exchangeable in the spirit of open, transparent mass collaboration and
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competition.” Specifically, the free software movement, in the words of its guru Richard Stallman
(with whose work Manning was familiar), promotes free software “not like free beer” (indeed, “free
software” might have a pricetag), but “as in freedom.” By “freedom,” Stallman means the freedom to
share the software with others – a freedom that sustains and enhances community, rather than
dividing it through creating lines of ownership – and to use it freely, by being able to change it, use it
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differently, or modify it. The ideal of free software does not suggest that everything must be up for
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grabs, but it does suggest that the “source code” of systems – information about how they function –
that affect us and our capacity to act freely and creatively should be freely available, modifiable, and
changeable through use.
While Manning does not go into much depth about the free public she imagines, her interest in
collaboration, her focus on the importance of public debate (rather than elite accountability), her
reference to the importance of freeing information, and her resistance to expert control of information
coheres with, and gestures toward, the free software ideal. Indeed, in both her description of her own
transition and her hopes for a public transition, Manning depicts truth-telling as part of the practice of
building a free community – not because it ensures accountability of leaders, but because it spurs
collaborative creativity and experimentation with alternative ways of living, with creating new worlds
rather than staying in our current one.

This appeal to an experimenting, creative public differentiates the transformative truth-teller (as I
am theorizing it via the example of Manning) from the whistleblower. The whistleblower surely solicits
a public, too. Yet where the whistleblower focuses on the import of using revealed facts to check
private interest and restore the government to a concern with the public good, the transformative
truth-teller foregrounds the import of the public transforming itself and the social world it inhabits – a
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transformation that cannot be controlled (or assured) by the act of truth-telling, itself. While acts of
whistleblowing may actually partake of the features of transformative truth-telling I have laid out here
– challenge to norms of publicness, staking its fate on the response of an uncertain public – the
whistleblower model hides those features from view and portrays the act of truth-telling as constative
and conservative, merely restoring the status quo, rather than performative and productive. In
contrast, the model of transformative truth-telling I have been developing draws attention to how truthtelling, under certain conditions, sparks public transformation, not just repetition, of our social and
political world.

5. Conclusion: Pluralizing Modes of Receptivity to Truth-Telling
Of course, Manning’s hopeful vision of her own transition and of the transformation of the public are
undoubtedly ideals to which reality may (and did) fail to conform. In leaking information, Manning, we
might say, solicited a self-transforming, non-conformative, creative public that ultimately failed to
appear. Yet it is the contention of this paper that Manning’s transformative truth-telling holds value
nonetheless. It holds value, first, in its challenge to the dominant model of the whistleblower and the
public/private distinction on which it relies – a model that marginalizes would-be truth-tellers who do
not fit into its mold. Second, Manning’s truth-telling also holds value in its risky turn to the public
(rather than the state) to vindicate her act through creatively and collaboratively using the information
that Manning released. This solicitation draws attention to the importance of (an always uncertain)
public response to the truth-telling – that is, to the fact that, as Linda Zerilli has argued, truth does not
become politically meaningful on its own, but only when the public acknowledges it as such through
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public debate and contest. Manning’s solicitation of a public also draws attention to how public
responses to truth-telling are important not only in acknowledging truth, but also in vindicating
the truth-teller as a proper public speaker. In sum, understood as an act of transformative truth-telling,
Manning’s act offers a powerful precedent for other marginalized would-be truth-tellers and reveals
the democratic promise and riskiness of truth-telling: that under certain conditions, truth-telling
productively challenges exclusive norms of publicness, but is at the same time dependent on an
uncertain public to redeem or vindicate that challenge.
However, transformative truth-telling contains other risks and limits. Acts like Manning’s do not
operate on only one register, and will not be heard in just one way. As I noted in my discussion of
Foucault and Vismann, Manning’s act certainly reveals and is parasitic on, even as it also seeks to
challenge, expert-driven discourses of confession, as well as the state’s authority as the proper
arbiter of truth. Thus, even when we engage in or respond to transformative truth-telling, the risk
remains that such acts of truth-telling will be publicly received as forms of whistleblowing that reentrench the authority of the state, or of discourses of expertise, as the proper arbiters of truth.
One way to respond to this problem of public reception would be to try to control it by returning to
the “analytics of truth” that I discussed at the outset of this essay – that is, by offering criteria for what
constitutes proper truth-telling or valid truth. Yet such an approach would obscure rather than respond
to the problems revealed in Manning’s failure to fit into the whistleblower model: namely, problems
not of assessing the truth of her statements (no one has denied they are true), but rather of how
norms of publicness constitute who counts as a proper truth-teller.
In the remainder of the conclusion, I will gesture toward and start to develop a more promising
response to this problem: namely, to thematize, encourage, and call for forms of public receptivity to
truth that are more open and generous to novel performances of truth-telling like Manning’s. It is, after
all, the assumption of Manning’s advocates that her truth-telling can only be defended as a form of
whistleblowing that leads them to ignore the ways in which her act of disclosure productively

challenges conventional models of truth-telling. Rather, then, than assuming that practices of truthtelling can be easily ascribed as legitimate or illegitimate – as the act of a whistleblower or not – what
if we instead decentered such categories of truth-telling, and allowed ourselves to listen to and be
challenged by forms of truth-telling that seek to make room for new (and perhaps freer) ways of
acting and speaking in public? Further, while we should remain attentive to how drives to disclosure
in contemporary politics shore up the authority of the state and experts, what if we were also attentive
to how such drives may perform truthtelling with a difference – that is, as a practice that enacts nonconformity to the dominant vision of the “public” and encourages diverse, plural, and non-conforming
forms of truth-telling?
One way to encourage such a broader receptivity to truth-telling is to foreground exemplars of
transformative truthtelling – such as Manning’s self-narration of her acts – through which democratic
actors may become attuned to alternative or dissident forms of truth-telling as democratically
productive. By attending to how Manning’s failure to fit into the dominant model of truth-telling – the
whistleblower model – creates precedents and spaces for other marginalized individuals to
transformatively tell the truth, democratic actors may become more able to see other supposed
“failed” truth-tellers as potentially enlivening figures for democratic politics, or they may be better able
to embark on an attempt to tell the truth, themselves, even with the prospect of potential failure and
risk.
There are risks to such a project, as well – risks that my interpretation and framing of Manning’s
act as one of transformative truth-telling may itself be “untrue” to its subject. Indeed, while I have
gleaned my reading of Manning’s public act from her narration of it in her chats with Adrian Lamo, she
understood those chats as private, or secret, and they were only released publicly by Wiredwhen
Lamo turned him in to the FBI. In addition, Manning’s self-understanding continues to
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evolve. Indeed, in the chat logs, she expresses a reluctance to become a public figure if she is
revealed as the source of the documents – not because she is afraid of punishment, but because she
feels that she has not yet figured herself, and her gender, out. She says, “i just … don’t wish to be a
part of it … at least not now … im not ready … I wouldn’t mind going to prison for the rest of my life,
or being executed so much, if it wasn’t for the possibility of having pictures of me… plastered all over
the world press … as a boy” (my emphasis, MLCL, 9). While one could read my analysis here as
another betrayal – on top of Lamo’s, and the Army’s – of Manning’s desire for the space and freedom
from surveillance so as to figure herself out, my hope is that this essay has actually served as a
complex rejoinder to the very reification of her self feared by Manning: that her picture would be
plastered all over the world as a boy. By attempting to do justice to her self-depiction, rather than
attempting to fit it into existing models of truth-telling (as most of her defenders have done), I hope I
have practiced a generous receptivity to her act, that the essay has unsettled the kinds of static
depictions of Manning that do the injustice to her that she feared, and that it has revealed the value of
her transformative truth-telling.
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Notes
1. At the time, Chelsea was known as Bradley Manning. I refer to Pfc. Manning as “Chelsea Manning” throughout
this paper, even though it deals with events when Chelsea was still known as Bradley, to respect and affirm
Chelsea Manning’s current self-understanding. As she said in a recent statement, her new name is “a far better,
richer, and more honest reflection of who I am and always have been: a woman named Chelsea” (“A Statement on

My Legal Name Change,” in The Huffington Post. Posted April 23, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chelseamanning/astatement-on-my-legal-name-change_b_5199874.html. Accessed April 28, 2014).
2. Wired released the full transcript of the chat logs, in a piece entitled “Manning-Lamo Chat Logs Revealed,” on
July 13, 2011 (http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/manning-lamo-logs; Accessed January 30, 2013).
Throughout this essay, I will cite them parenthetically as MLCL, with page numbers that refer to the page numbers
of my print-out of the chat log.
3. Ginger Thompson. “Early Struggles of Soldier Charged in Leak Case,” in New York Times. Published August 8,
2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/09/us/09manning.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed March 14, 2013.
4. I draw the term “vindication” from Bonnie Honig’s “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in
Democratic Theory,” in American Political Science Review 101(2007):1, pp. 1–17. She draws the term from
Oakeshott, who distinguishes vindication – which occurs via response to persuasive argument – from rational
justification, which precedes and secures an argument.
5. This is different from Foucault’s parrhesiastes, who stakes his claim of truth on himself, on his status and
reputation. See Foucault’s Fearless Speech (ed. Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001). Hereafter
cited in the text as FS.
6. Joshua Cohen. “Truth and Public Reason,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 37(2009):1, 2–42, p. 41. Cohen is
contesting John Rawls’ view that public reason cannot involve a conception of truth – because such a conception of
truth would be exclusive rather than providing a shared ground for reasonable debate without recourse to
metaphysical justification. Cohen argues in contrast that the reasonable debate presupposed in Rawls’ conception
of public reason necessarily involves a conception of truth.
7. Cohen argues that this political conception should “include at least four commonplaces about truth” (26): that
believing something means “believing (asserting, judging) true”; 2) that “[t]rue beliefs present things as they are…,
and in that uncontroversial sense correspond to how things are”; 3) “[t]here is a distinction between truth and
warrant or justification”; and 4) that “truth is important; and, given that truth is different from warrant, that truth is
important in away different from the way that warrant is important” (27).
8. Here, my critique of Cohen’s (and others’) focus on the problem of truth (rather than truth-telling) echoes Iris
Marion Young’s critique of deliberative democratic ideals of rational discourse, which assume that “people’s ways of
speaking and understanding will be the same” – an assumption which holds true “only if we also eliminate their
cultural differences and different social positions” (“Communication and the Other,” in Democracy and Difference,
ed. Seyla Benhabib. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, 122–123).
9. Michel Foucault. Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001, p. 169.
10. Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth, trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 2–3.
11. Foucault, Fearless Speech, p.170.
12. Ibid., p. 169.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 170.
15. Arendt says that, under “normal circumstances,” truthtelling tends “toward the acceptance of things as they are”
(Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin, 1968, p. 251). For Arendt,
the truthteller’s only political act can be to reveal facts in the face of deception, much like the traditional
whistleblower model: “Where everybody lies about everything of importance, the truthteller, whether he knows it or
not, has begun to act; he, too, has engaged himself in political business, for, in the unlikely event that he survives,
he has made a start toward changing the world” (Ibid.).
16. Unless otherwise noted, my knowledge of Bradley Manning’s life comes from Denver Nicks’ thorough
biography, Private: Bradley Manning, Wikileaks, and the Biggest Exposure of Official Secrets in American History.
Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2012.

17. Manning admitted to the leaking in his guilty plea to some of the charges leveled against him by the Army. For
this paper, I have used Alexa O’Brien’s transcription of his guilty plea statement (2/28/13), which can be found
here:http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_providence_hea
ring_statement.html; Accessed 2/28/13.
18. In her decision to reduce Manning’s ultimate sentence by 112 days due to the treatment she received while in
military prison, the trial judge, Denise Lind, “said Manning's confinement was ‘more rigorous than necessary.’ She
added that the conditions ‘became excessive in relation to legitimate government interests.’” (David Dishneau,
“Bradley [Chelsea] Manning Ruling: Judge Reduces Sentence for Army Private in WikiLeaks Case,” in The
Huffington Post, January 18, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/bradleymanningruling_n_2432946.html. Accessed April 28, 2014.)
19. Charlie Savage, “Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a Pivotal Leak of U.S. Files,” in The New York Times,
August 21, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/manning-sentenced-for-leakinggovernmentsecrets.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed April 28, 2014.
20. See Manning’s “A Statement on My Legal Name Change.” The article notes that Manning prefers to use
“trans*” with an asterix, so as to include those who do not feel that they fit into the gender binary.
21. Yochai Benkler. “The Dangerous Logic of the Bradley Manning Case,” in The New
Republic.Http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112554#; published March 1, 2013; accessed March 15, 2013.
22. Ibid.
23. Nader says, “Today, arbitrary treatment of citizens by powerful institutions has assumed a new form, no less
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